Political activity of contemporary western societies has been structured based on a definition of territorial units of action, which we call states. This western political structure has been legitimised by a link between each state to a collective owner of sovereignty, which we call a nation. The life of this society revolves around areas linked to different fields of community life, such as production, consumption, distribution of work, etc., including the discursive elements of these practices. Social practices take place within the complex interaction between all these fields of relations, which we call social structure. Each of these collective forms (states, nations and social structure) outline several geographic and social areas, to facilitate or hinder the construction of certain collective identities and, therefore, facilitate or hinder the production of certain collective actions. In the first part, this article opens a discussion on the relationship between the concepts of state, nation, and social structure. Later, the article endeavours to empirically apply the theoretical discussion to the Valencian case, to reveal the mechanisms underlying the construction of its collective identity.
INTRODUCTION

THE STATE: TERRITORY AND COMMUNITY
Throughout history, political communities have evolved from taxation groups to absolute monarchies, and in turn, from the latter into modern states: the result is a wide range of territorial dimensions. As size increases, strength (even if it is through voting) tends to replace consensus: political power tends to hold onto elements of domestic power, but without being mitigated by emotional bonds.
Weber considers that "the state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory-the concept of 'territory' is essential to the definition" (Weber, 1922, p. 1,056) . The state's action is always a territorial action delimited by borders, binding its citizens. The organisational core of the state is comprised by a rational apparatus with a permanent and centralised military power, which monopolises the creation of law and the legitimate use of force, and it organises the administration with a dominance of specialised public officials.
From thereon, public administration, territoriality, and community become central components of collective action.
For Marx, the political structure sanctions the social order established through the dominant mode of production: social relations provide an explanation of the state, and not the other way round. The social division of work facilitates the emergence of bureaucracy, with the separation of private interests and general interests, and the split between the private and the public. This split produces a dual life; life in the political community, where the individual is a citizen and is valued as a social being, and life in civil society, where they act as a private person and consider the others as means ('objects'). However, bureaucracy is intended to be the will of the state and state power, and its particular interest is aimed at being general. The State's objectives become those of bureaucracy, and vice versa, without this impenetrable combination excluding conflicts. Thus, the state summarises and represents social conflicts, the needs of society as a whole, expressed through the mode of production, establishing a close connection between social structure and the state.
The state's power is therefore based on the monopoly it holds, whether legitimate or illegitimate, over the use of force. It is a power based on violence, or the threat of using it, in other words, the power to destroy life or to protect it from destruction. However, the state can only exercise its power over a community within the limits of a territory. That is to say, the state is structured around natural elements that give rise to social constructs: in the state, the people and land become the nation and territory (Foucault, 1996 (Foucault, , 2006 (Foucault, , 2007 .
Bourdieu tries to complete the Weberian definition, as the state's power becomes clearly apparent within the realm of symbolic relationships: "the state is an X (to be determined) which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population" (Bourdieu, 1994, pp. 97-8) .
This symbolic violence facilitates the concealment of possible alternatives, such as the ultimate expression of power (Lukes, 2005) .
That is why, for Habermas (1976, p. 245) , the state emerges in order to ensure the identity of the social group, in order to legitimise coercion and in order to achieve social integration more effectively. According to his approach, through binding decisions, the state prevents social disintegration. In order to be maintained and remain effective in the long term, political dominance needs to obtain recognition as the legitimate power, and not only as the legal power.
Thus, in addition to the official apparatus of the government, the components inherent to all states, whether they are traditional or modern, are a territory that delimits the exercise of power and legitimate rights, which provides backing to the decisions made by the government in the territory. The sources of this legitimacy have changed over time, and in Western modernity it is communities which have become 'nations' that assume this legitimising capacity.
States, nations, and societies: a case study of Valencia
Territoriality
Territorial action, like all social action, is always aimed at affecting, influencing, or controlling the ideas and actions of others (Weber, 1922, p. 5) and consequently, also their access to resources, which means that territorial relationships are the result of power.
The real political space of relations of domination is defined by the relationship between the dis-tribution of powers and assets within the geographical space, and the distribution of agents within this space, the geographical distance to those assets and powers is a good index of power (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 70) .
These territorial divisions have significant effects over who is dominated, by whom, and for what purpose. The creation of a territory produces a special kind of space that, unlike others, requires a constant effort in terms of establishment, maintenance and reproduction (Sack, 1986; Soja, 1985) . Whatever the scale, all societies need to engage in territorial activities in order to coordinate efforts and specify responsibilities. Therefore, when we talk about territory, we are talking about a structured series of economic and cultural resources that are established within in the space (infrastructures, industries, social provisions, etc.) which facilitate social functioning, and form the foundation of the mode or production (Harvey, 1985; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983) .
Thus, any territorial organisation can oppose the interests and objectives of certain social groups.
Territorial behaviour is not only a means of creating and maintaining order, rather, it is a resource for creating and maintaining a context to experience the world through, and give it meaning. The territory is therefore a physical element, defined geographically by its borders, but it is also a symbolic element that affects the definition of the community itself and 
Legitimacy: identities and communities
Identity is a process through which meaning is constructed, along with an objective for action, addressing one or several personal attributes, which are given priority over the other possible sources of meaning (Castells, 1997, from p. 28 onwards) .
Identity fulfils three main functions: it helps us to take decisions and to make sense of and establish objectives for action: it makes relationships possible with others, by enabling mutual recognition in positions and relationships, and it provides strength and resistance, by giving references for action (Guibernau, 1997, p. 115) .
These attributes establish limits between those that have them and those that do not, therefore the fission and fusion of social limits affect individuals in terms of identity. These limits can be contested, DEBATS · Annual Review, 2 · 2017 but not abolished: the disappearance of one always involves the emergence of another (Oommen, 1995) .
The social significance of specific attributes, which are possessed individually but shared collectively, leads to the emergence of collective identities, which facilitate cohesion between those who share these attributes ('us'), through similarity-based strategies, and distinguish those that do not share said attributes ('them'), through strategies of differentiation or diversification (Barrera-González, 1997, p. 232; Bourdieu, 1979) .
Socialisation processes are those constructing correspondence between the social structure and cognitive and symbolic structures (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 205) : the correspondence between the objective divisions of the social world and the principles of "vision and division" that the agents apply.
Ongoing exposure to specific social conditions imprints long-lasting attitudes on individuals, who interiorise the needs of the social environment and inscribe their outer reality onto their inner being. "Talking about habitus is to suggest that what is individual, and even personal, and what is subjective, is also social and collective. Habitus is a socialised subjectivity" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 104) . This correspondence fulfils eminently political roles, because the symbolic systems are not only instruments of knowledge but also instruments of domination. Recognition of legitimacy is rooted in the harmony between the cognitive structures that become unconscious, and the objective ones.
In the process of constructing collective identities, a path is taken that leads us from diversity and social complexity to public statements about shared identity via mechanisms that Larrain (1994, p. 164 ) groups into four specific elements:
(1) Selection mechanisms; only some attributes, some symbols, and the social experience of some groups is taken into account, the rest are excluded. It is these objectification processes that can result in conflict. When the first and second coincide, but the third does not, we face a clash of identities or a conflict between identities. At the same time, the existence of these conflicts is a form of objectifying collective identity. This is a conflict based on the non-correspondence between legal recognition and de facto recognition. As Simmel (1908) said, whenever the interests of two elements refer to the same object, the possibility of coexistence depends on whether there is a boundary line that separates them.
If the limitation is juridical (in law) it can mean the end of the conflict, if it is based around power (de facto) it may mark the start of conflict. When the first objectification and the second do not coincide, we face identity conflicts or conflicts about identity if States, nations, and societies: a case study of Valencia the definition is questioned socially from within the group, from outside the group, or from both sides of the boundary, the identity is not socially obvious.
The identity conflict is a conflict about the collective 'us', between two or more forms of defining reality. In any case, these conflicts regarding identity necessarily contain conflicts between identities.
Therefore, states may be questioned regarding the conflictive nature of the identity that they promote over their territory, and that they aim to be legitimised in order to exercise power. That is to say, states can see their legitimacy questioned due to the emergence of alternative collective territorial political projects.
NATIONS
It is not clear therefore that the state is a community, as Weber claims. The state is undoubtedly a form of the territorial organisation of political power, which needs legitimisation. It is therefore advisable, as suggested by Connor (1994) and Tivey (1981) , to differentiate between the concepts of state and nation. The most detrimental flaw in "scholarly approaches to nationalism lie in the fact that there has been a tendency to use the term nation to denote a territorial legal unity, the state" (Connor, 1994) . Its relationships may coincide, when the territory and the community governed by the state overlap, or do not coincide, when a specific territory is home to a community that differs to that which is promoted by the state (Pérez-Agote, 1989, p. 184) . That is why Guibernau (1997) asserts that there may be legitimate states and illegitimate states, and Hall (1999) analyses national identities as independent variables in studies on internal or external state policies.
Nations are a phenomenon that belong to the world of the conscience of social agents. They are effective to the extent they are capable of influencing or determining the behaviour of the agents. This capacity depends on the social objectivity achieved, in the sense of what is socially recognised in a shared way. It is therefore a performative category (Pérez-Agote, 1993): its production and reproduction is linked to its capacity for social mobilisation (Máiz, 1997) . Ultimately, a nation is an imagined community (Anderson, 1983) , formed by a group of individuals that identify between one another on the basis of very different attributes -including territoriality, volition, history, and ethnicity-according to the specific situation, and which is considered the sovereign subject of political power over a territory (Gellner, 1997; Núñez, 1998; Smith, 1989) .
It is this nature of exclusionary legitimacy that distinguishes a national identity from a regional identity. A regional community is an identity that is politically subordinated to the identity of the nation state. According to Moreno (1997) , what regionalist movements have in common with nationalist ones is their basis in a territorial identity, the existence of a conflict with the state (whether economic, political, or cultural) and the emergence of political and social mobilisation organisations. However, as Pérez-Agote (1995) points out, in order to recognise the legitimacy of state power, regionalisms do not demand the capacity for self-determination, but rather the delegation of the central power to the regional territory. Nevertheless, regional identities, regionalisms, and regional institutions can act as active builders of a national identity: they can generate the perception of shared and different interests and create favourable conditions for the emergence of a nationalist movement (Nuñez, 1998) .
SOCIETIES: SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The construction of national identities presupposes the existence of specific social conditions: in relation to ethnicity (Smith, 1986) , social structure (Hroch, 1985) , and/or territory (Hechter, 1985) . However, obtaining a functioning notion of 'society' for empirical research is difficult, for two main reasons: the difficulty of establishing consistent limits in time and space, and the difficulty of determining whether the limits define a differentiated and coherent social entity (Tilly, 1984, from p. 37 onwards). However, we can make it work with DEBATS · Annual Review, 2 · 2017 the use of the concept of social structure, in the sense of a framework of relations that organises the activities of the parts that form it. In fact, the term social structure is almost always used to refer to the characteristics of groups, as traits that cannot be attributed to individuals.
At times it denotes the coherence of social institutions, at others it opposes it, in order to refer to more persistent and organised societal relationships. Although the agents involved are not always aware of its consistency, the structures continue working, regardless of their conscience and desire.
The major theoretical debates of social sciences have focused on the nature of this relationship between individuals and society, and can be summarised in two blocks. A debate about whether social agents are free when they act, or whether they are constrained by external conditioning factors; and a debate about whether structure is conferred by the material characteristics of society, or by its immaterial characteristics. However, the most recent approaches attempt to integrate this duality in order to try to acquire an image that more accurately portrays the complexity of the social and structural dynamic: material and immaterial, voluntaristic and deterministic, all at the same time (Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992) .
Social agents operate simultaneously in several exchange networks: bodies with the ecosystem, the production of goods and services, power and social control, fears and beliefs, where emotional, economic, political and cultural resources are exchanged (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Villasante, 2000) . Among these interrelated areas, the political sphere (with the state as the central institution) plays an especially important role, inasmuch as it has the capacity to formalise the rules for exchange with the other interrelated areas.
Social actions are approached as recursive processes, created by social agents, but continuously recreated through multiple structural resources. The continuity of these social practices presupposes reflexivity that is only possible because of the continuity of the practices themselves (Giddens, 1984; Lamo de Espinosa, 1990 ).
The result is contingent and has no specific direction: it seems that the strategies lead nowhere in particular. Fate is uncertain, unclear and risky, and social change has no apparent direction (Therborn, 2000) , thus building a society of risk (Beck, 1998) . As Sztompka points out (1993, p. 190 The País Valencià shatters the expectations outlined by the main theories on nationalism. It is a society with its own language, which differs from Castilian Spanish, even though language is considered as a cultural States, nations, and societies: a case study of Valencia hallmark with a great capacity for transmitting identity, especially in conflict situations (Ninyoles, 1971) . This is also a society that has also very quickly implemented processes to absorb an immigrant population, which according to the primordialist theses, could have generated identification according to origin (Geertz, 1973; Shils, 1957) . Furthermore, the economic structure is based on outsourcing which, according the theories of rational choice, would facilitate the presence of a national political conflict (Hechter, 1989; Rogowski, 1985) . Moreover, the political decentralisation process of the Kingdom of Spain, with the introduction of the system of autonomous regions or communities, could have reinforced sub-state identities, as an effect of the regional policies themselves (Brubaker, 1996) , or as the result of the structure of political opportunities that this new form of territorial organisation offers (Tarrow, 1994) .
Nevertheless, it is as if Spain had achieved its objective of creating a Spanish national community in Valencia.
As it is frequently pointed out, this is certainly very much the case: from the territories in the Kingdom of Spain, Valencian society is among those that identify most closely with Spain. However, it is also true that the Valencian case is more complex which we should study more deeply to better understand, and to highlight some of the mechanisms that may have helped it reach this level of adhesion.
The Valencian territory
One of the greatest issues for the progress of a possible alternative policy to the Spanish one in Valencia is the special territorial concentration of a population from the constituency of Alicante (especially in the provincial capital and its area of influence towards the south), which believes its community is not the Valencian community. (Burguera, 1990; Guía, 1985) . None of the possible national positions view the Valencian territory as autonomous, and the immense majority opt to identify with Spain.
The Valencian social structure: territorial origins
The construction of an alternative identity calls for the existence of an alternative social structure that is (Fuster, 1962; Mira, 1997) .
Language as an identifying trait
Language usually plays a highly significant role in the construction of collective identities and in the Valencian case it assumes a crucial leading role (Ninyoles, 1969; Piqueras, 1996) . The process of replacing Valencian with Castilian Spanish has progressed greatly since the 1960s, with prominent state intervention in the political, educational, and communicational systems. If we recall the definition of legitimation provided by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 120-121) , by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) In fact, up until very recently, it was practically impossible to predict the position on nationalism depending on associations with the political-party system; the Valencian parliamentary system does not express any national conflict (Beltrán, 1994; Franch, 1996; Mira, 1994 
Conflict regarding identity and performativity
CONCLUSIONS
Our conclusions lead us to put forward three arguments to explain the minimal impact achieved by alternative definitions to the one proposed by Spanish politics.
These are arguments to which we must add the effects of state structural intervention on Valencian reality, with policies aimed at dismantling attributes with the potential to promote a desire for collective power, which might challenge the Spanish definition.
Political vagueness
In Valencia, apparently, language is the only attribute with a certain capacity for political construction. This confirms that a language without a territorial reference does not create a nation, but rather a region (Keating, 1996; Linz, 1985) .
A murky consciousness
The murky consciousness is based in the high level of identification with the Spanish territory, the lack of linguistic appreciation of Valencian It is worth highlighting an aspect deriving from this dissonance that is very important when it comes to determining the nationalist positions of Valencians:
anti-Catalan prejudice (Bello, 1988; Flor, 2011) .
This prejudice operates within the framework of a murky consciousness and it especially affects the local population, and those with regionalist tendencies. Thus, while a lack of political definition was especially linked to nationalist Valencian positions, this cognitive contradiction is more linked to regionalist positions.
The incompatibility between Valencian nationalists and regionalists
The 
